Comparing Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: The State of the Field

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“Vienna shall not become Jerusalem”
—Karl Lueger, Major of Vienna, c. 1910

“Vienna shall not become Istanbul”
—Heinz Christian Strache, Chair of the Austrian Freedom Party, 2005

ABSTRACT: In the European public discourse on Islamophobia, comparisons of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia have provoked heated debates. The academic discourse has also touched on this issue, an example being the works of Edward Said, where he alludes to connections between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Following the 2003 publication of the Islamophobia report produced by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), which discusses the similarities between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism, scholars in various fields began a debate that compares and contrasts anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Participants in this debate include Matti Bunzl, Brian Klug, Sabine Schiffer, Nasar Meer, Wolfgang Benz, and many others. To some degree, the academias of the German- and English-speaking worlds have conducted this discourse separately.

This paper surveys, to a degree, the state of the field of the comparative approach to studying Islamophobia and anti-Semitism as a pair, and also presents some central topoi and associated questions. It aims to highlight primary insights that have been gained from such a comparison, including how this comparison has been discussed and criticized, and what similarities and differences have been identified on which levels. It questions which epistemological assumptions were made in taking such a comparative approach, and which political discourses—especially regarding the Holocaust and the conflict in Israel/Palestine (which are not part of this discussion)—have shaped this debate in many forums, including academia. Furthermore, this paper discusses which possible aspects of comparative research on anti-Semitism and Islamophobia have not yet been explored, and where there could perhaps lay more possibilities for further investigation.

Keywords: anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, comparison, race, racism, discourse

INTRODUCTION

Soon after the introduction of the term ‘Islamophobia’ in public and academic debates, a debate arose regarding the possibilities and limits of comparative approaches and analogies with respect to the relationship between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Although Edward Said stated in his magnum opus, Orientalism, that anti-Semitism was Islam’s “strange secret-sharer,”² and later also cited the similarities between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism, only a few scholars took this discussion up.³ One instigator of a lively academic debate on the subject after Said was the anthropologist Matti Bunzl, which was precipitated by his 2005 volume, Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds Old and New in
This article was in response to a report on Islamophobia and anti-Semitism presented by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) in 2003, and consequently led to a critical debate about Bunzl’s theories, which included commentaries by Brian Klug, Paul Silverstein, and others. This debate still stirs controversy, and is frequently a starting point of current arguments about the relationship between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism. Along with a number of monographs and anthologies, three journals have dedicated special issues to investigating the relationship between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in recent years: European Societies (2012), Ethnic and Racial Studies (2013), and Patterns of Prejudice (2014). German scholars, in particular, have dedicated time to studying this relationship, despite only a few being known in global academia or outside of the German-speaking world.

Meanwhile, claims of parallels between anti-Semitic and Islamophobic experiences, as well as discussions of the possibility and impossibility of such comparisons, have caused many public controversies. Brian Klug discusses the statement made in 2008 by Britain’s first Muslim minister, Shahid Malik, when he said, “I think most people would agree that, if you ask Muslims today what they feel like, they feel like the Jews of Europe.” A similar premise is contained in Wolfgang Benz’s op-ed published in 2010, where he states that a comparative approach in studying Islamophobia and anti-Semitism would be a sensible source of insights into a relatively new phenomenon (Islamophobia), drawing on the long-established field of anti-Semitism studies in Germany. This comparative perspective was also shared by Jews, such as the Dutch politician, Job Cohen. He was harshly criticized when, shortly after the electoral success of Geert Wilder’s PVV party in the Netherlands, he compared his mother’s sense of exclusion in the years leading up to World War II to the current circumstances of Muslims in Europe. Cohen, a Social Democrat, was then attacked as “Amsterdam’s decoy Jew.” But John Bunzl titled one of his op-eds The Protocols of the Elders of Mecca,” deploying longstanding tropes in anti-Semitism studies.

This paper aims to provide an overview of the status of this intellectual examination and political debate, recounting the discussions and scrutinizing the fundamental questions raised, but also identifying some of the blind spots associated with such an undertaking. To begin with, in the following section, I will discuss the relevant political implications of this review. The second section will present the different levels of comparative analysis that have presently been covered and investigated. The following section will discuss the issue of race as a mutual blind spot of Islamophobia- and anti-Semitism studies. Next, will be discussed another topic that has received little attention: the use of both ideologies as a “tool of power.” In the concluding section, I will attempt to sum up the potentials of such comparative analyses.

**HOW MUCH POLITICS?**

In an interview of Sindre Bangstad with Matti Bunzl (both anthropologists) in 2009, the latter argued that “no comparison is neutral…. If one undertakes a comparison… in the broadest sense we can always find, between essentially any two groups, similarities and differences. And it is often a political choice or an analytic choice whether we want to foreground the similarities or the difference.” Bunzl defines the similarities and differences of both phenomena. Although he argues that “Islamophobia, in a political sense, is more pressing than anti-Semitism,” at the same time—in the context of some people arguing that Muslims are the new Jews of Europe.
Europe—he emphasizes that “the fate of European Jewry, which we associate today with the catastrophe of the Holocaust, is not something that... is conceivable today for any population.” As such, in his view the parallels of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are that both groups “are imagined... as being Other, as being outside the frame of what is considered normal.” At the same time he stresses that, “while anti-Semitism was designed to protect the purity of the ethnic nation-state, Islamophobia is marshalled to safeguard the future of European civilization.” So, from a political perspective, Bunzl seems to be interested in gaining insight into patterns of both phenomena in an analytical sense, while not only distinguishing their function (nation-state versus supranational order), which could likewise be contextualized as part of different historical patterns, but also by especially making a political statement that “never again” (Holocaust) is a political reality. Certainly, such a wish would be shared by most people today (although there are exceptions, such as white supremacists), but it remains no more than a wish. As racism scholars Malcolm Brown and Robert Miles assert, ethnic cleansing in the West has happened since World War II, with the racialized Bosnian Muslims as the victims. Thus, other authors argue, in relation to the Holocaust, that it is “essential not to use that invocation of uniqueness to close down the possibility that a combined if not a comparative discussion of its horrors and its patterns of legitimation might be fruitful in making sense of modern racisms.”

Bunzl stands in stark contrast to David Cesarani, who goes as far as calling it “positively dangerous” to compare anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, and criticizes Bunzl for “downplaying anti-Semitism and exaggerating Islamophobia.” The main weakness of Cesarani’s argument, in my view, is that he treats “Muslim” and “Islam” as ontological categories. He is not one of those scholars who argue—based on long established insights into anti-Semitism studies—that Islamophobia tells us more about the Islamophobe than it tells us about Islam and Muslims.

An important political dimension, which is often inherent in a public debate on anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, is the historical uniqueness of the killing of six million Jews. Stating that anti-Semitism and Islamophobia have something in common is especially troubling to those in power who should fight Islamophobia more than they do. Along these lines, Sabine Schiffer and Constantin Wagner argue that it is “absurd to claim that Muslims today are in the same situation as Jews ‘back then’ ... instead, the goal should be to recognize racist mechanisms before even the threat of a comparable situation arises... The fact that we must assume that a total catastrophe is capable of repetition must be treated separately from the fact that the Shoah is a historically singular phenomenon, and that victims and perpetrators can be named specifically.” Such perspectives are rather rare in academic debates, to say nothing of public ones, and as Esther Romeyn analyzes from the Dutch perspective (which, in my opinion, can also be argued for many other European countries), the redemptive use of the Holocaust and the Shoah as lessons for a post-racial Europe serves a nationalist and racist conceit that constructs European identity against disenfranchised Muslim populations. She concludes:

If the Holocaust provides the moral compass of the new Europe, its lessons need to be universalized, and extended beyond the uniqueness of the Holocaust and the specificity of anti-Semitism and Jewish suffering to include all forms of exclusion, discrimination and intolerance.
In fact, one could even interpret Romeyn’s line of thinking as liberating the Holocaust from being misused and reduced to a historical incident, and from being constructed as a unique and “never again” possibility. I would also add that this reduction of anti-Semitism to the Holocaust is misleading and dangerous, as it not only blurs the historical dimension of anti-Semitism, but also makes it impossible to grasp contemporary anti-Semitism. Scholars like Micha Brumlik or Brian Klug, who—based on the assumption above—have worked with such a comparison, have decisively pointed out that comparison does not mean equation. Wolfgang Benz has added that the comparison of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia does not mean to equate Jews and Muslims as facing the same situation. On the contrary, comparing always leaves the question open as to whether one will find parallels, differences, or, in most cases, both. Brian Klug further points out that the question is whether analogies between the two phenomena are strong or weak. And, if one selects similarities or differences, this reflects, politically, the “larger agenda that we are promoting,” and “analytically, they depend on the enquiry that we are pursuing.” He then takes his argument a step further: “We can ask other questions: Are the two phenomena alike in terms of their sources or causes? Do they have a similar impact on the lives of Jews and Muslims? Is the scale of bigotry comparable?” In his article, Klug gives a simple answer to the question of whether anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are analogous. He says: yes and no. Furthermore, for the sake of shedding light on the social and political realities that confront us, if analogy helps us to do so, Klug invites us to embrace it. Additionally, Schiffer and Wagner argue that it is important to distinguish between comparisons on different levels. This is what will be done in the next section.

**LEVELS OF COMPARISON**

*The Nature of Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia*

Departing from an assumption that anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are based on imaginings and constructions, some scholars of psychology and psychoanalysis argue that anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are also “the shadow of Western civilization, a decivilization of war and violence against the internal ‘other’ of Western civilization: Jewry and Islam, the crusades and the Shoah,” and hence share a common nature, a “deeply embedded culture” (*Tiefenkultur*). According to Wilfried Graf, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia both serve as the historical “collective preconscious” and “unconscious” in the Freudian sense, which can thus be historically, socially, and culturally coined, shaped, and changed. For Graf, on an ideological and collective level, they stand in for the vacancy left by Communism and Catholicism in the mid-1980s. According to him, both are surrogates for this emptiness.

Anti-Semitism, as the much more familiar object of investigation in much of the academic literature on the comparison of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism, clearly serves as the starting point of thought and argument on Islamophobia. It is not surprising that scholars like Moshe Zuckermann argue that, because anti-Semitism is taboo in Germany, and because anti-Semites cannot openly utter anti-Semitic statements anymore, Islamophobia may have become an outlet for hidden or latent anti-Semitism. At the same time, these analyses indicate a similarity in the meanings, as well as the functions, of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism.
While Matti Bunzl has argued that both Islamophobia and anti-Semitism function as the Other, Brian Klug adds that they share more attributes in relation to Europe. First of all, both religions have a troubled relationship to Christianity. According to Klug, while Christianity is portrayed as the forbearing, forgiving religion, Judaism and Islam are conceived as legalistic, vengeful, and merciless religions. Second, both religions have tended to be regarded as antithetical to Enlightenment. And third, both are part of the history of what Said calls Orientalism. The Jew was, for a long time, seen as the “Asiatic Oriental” within Europe, while the Muslim was the Oriental outside. Klug further points to the fact that the figures of Jew and Muslim were very different in the Enlightenment as well as in Orientalism, and, therefore, calls for further investigation into the logics that these representations imply. But there is no doubt a relation between the figures of Jew and Muslim in Western experience. One indication of this is that the most humiliated and physically degraded Jews in Nazi concentration camps were called *Muselmänner*, or Muslims, because the Nazis knew them as people who prostrated themselves on the ground.

**Historical Perspectives**

The historical dimension of comparison is, interestingly enough, a contested issue for some scholars. Some anti-Semitism scholars argue that Islamophobia is a very new phenomenon, while anti-Semitism is two thousand years old. Others have refuted this argument simply by pointing to Said’s famous *Orientalism* treatise, and many other historical works, showing that Islam has been Christianity’s “Other” from the Enlightenment to the present, despite there not being a traceable linear pathway. This restriction of the notion of Islamophobia to a contemporary object has consequently restricted comparative studies because anti-Semitism is generally perceived as a much wider, encompassing territory from Christian anti-Judaism/Judeophobia, to *Völkisch* anti-Semitism, to secondary anti-Semitism. The historical restriction of Islamophobia to a solely contemporary phenomenon has excluded deeper, historically comparative, investigations.

In contrast to this line of argument, Anya Topolski has asserted that both anti-Semitism and Islamophobia have been the religious Others of a Europe perceived as Christian. But the implications of certain historical narratives have only been touched upon. A systematic analysis is missing. Psychoanalytical approaches—such as that of Freud himself—have stressed that some of the hatred towards Jews is based on deeply religious differences. Some anti-Semitism scholars argue that Jewish monotheism ultimately removes Christianity’s illusion of divinity. One could ask if the revelation of Islam’s last Prophet, Muhammad, namely that the Virgin Mary’s son would descend and “break the cross and kill the swine,” might also mark a symbolic dissociation in a dialectic relationship of the geographical and religious historical propinquity to monopolize truth.

However, even without immersing ourselves in psychoanalytical theory while remaining in the realm of culture, we cannot forget that images of Islam as a heretic cult—the Ka’ba as an idol, Muhammad as an areligious hedonist, and the anti-Christ himself—had been constitutive moments in Europe’s imagination and its creation. As Nxy Matar states, “Jews were stigmatized for ‘crucifying’ Jesus, so were Muslims stigmatized for circumcising Christians.” Glynis Cousin and Robert Fine rightly point out that racism (including anti-Muslim racism) and anti-Semitism “have a connected history that is rooted in the formative period of European modernity,” which is linked to the “formation of homogenous Christian nations within a Europe that was achieved through the ‘exclusion’ of Jews and Moors.”

Cousin and Fine argue that, with two forms of violence—the expulsion and persecution of Muslims and Jews from Spain and the institutionalization of the Atlantic slave trade—the idea of “Europe” was born. But this is a rarely adopted historical perspective. After World War II, “race relations” focused on the disadvantaged and discriminated-against minorities, and Jews were increasingly seen as part of white Europe. But rather than creating bonds of solidarity between minorities with common histories, there arose a “competition of victimhood” between Jews and people of color. This can be said as much for Muslims and Jews.

The former head of the Berlin-based Center for Research on Anti-Semitism, Wolfgang Benz, who is a leading figure in the German-speaking debate on the relation of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, has supported a comparative approach of contemporary Islamophobia and historical Christian, as well as Völkisch, anti-Semitism. He reminds us that Jews were charged with well-poisoning in 1321, based on the notion that Muslims had incited them to do so. During the Reformation, Jews were portrayed as the companions of the devil, who had a pact with the Turks. He argues that, just as Jewish “emancipation” and the definition of German Jewish identity were at the heart of the debate regarding German anti-Semitism during the last century, such is the case now in Islamophobic debates. This time the question is not the emancipation of Jews, but the “integration” of Muslims.

Benz proceeds to list many parallels of how Muslims are similarly marked as “the Other” in comparison to Jews in Germany. Interestingly enough, a number of rhetorical strategies are nearly identical. Consequently, many scholars have concentrated on analyzing anti-Semitic and Islamophobic discourses.

**Analyzing Discourses**

Especially in Germany, where anti-Semitism has historically played a major role and is deeply enshrined in the society’s history, many scholars have emphasized the identical styles of arguments, images, and discourses used to exclude Jews and Muslims from the constructed “we.” Schiffer and Wagner were the first to present a large study of shared patterns in anti-Semitic and Islamophobic discourses, in which they identified “collective constructions, dehumanisation, misinterpretation of religious imperatives (proof by ‘sources’), and conspiracy theories.” The “parallel society” of Muslims becomes what was the Jewish “state within a state” in European societies. As political scientist Jana Kübel has shown, the link to religion is the very shared basis of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. In one instance, Islam is a religion, in the next it is culture, but it is always something alien. Religion, in this wider sense, becomes the common thread of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. The alien religion becomes the antimodernist object. The Islamic ummah (community) becomes the object in contrast to the nation, as was the case with the global Jewish community. While the global Jewish community was said to have exerted power due to its access to capital, the Islamization of the world is said to be happening via demographics and a number of Jihad projects. Behind mosques and synagogues lurks the parallel society, which is incompatible with the majority. The calls to assimilation in terms of how to build mosques and synagogues are based on a desire for homogeneity and national purity. Kübel also discusses obvious differences, such as the image of women. Gendered Islamophobia represents Islam as a masculine religion that oppresses women, while, in anti-Semitic thought, Judaism is a feminine religion, with the woman as a sexualized seductress.
In fact, the rhetorical parallels in the German-speaking context are almost too obvious, as illustrated by the following two examples. The far-right political party in Austria, the Freedom Party (FPÖ), used a slogan during an election campaign in 2004 saying that “Vienna should not become Istanbul.” Back in 1994, a similar slogan “Vienna should not become Chicago” had been used (referring to the black population in Vienna). But interestingly enough, Karl Lueger, the godfather of Adolf Hitler’s anti-Semitism, used the slogan “Vienna should not become Jerusalem,” referring to the many Jewish people (some of whom were traditional rather than assimilated). Another example would be the discourse on Verjudung. While Adolf Hitler himself accused the Socialist Parties of being verjudet (Jewified), the FPÖ argued during the Viennese election campaigns that the Social Democratic Party in Vienna was an Islamist party. Muslims were taking over the party, usurping it, they said. The Social Democrats would Islamicize the country and oppress women. A campaign slogan stated: “We protect women’s rights. The SPÖ makes people wear a headscarf.”

Although many of these discursive constructions are interesting to look at, as they reveal important insights into the discursive construction of the Other, one must always keep in mind that, in anti-Semitism and Islamophobia work, images of the Other are very fluid and can change easily, depending on the interests of the anti-Semite and the Islamophobe. Therefore, while the question of similarity and difference in an actual discourse may be helpful to understand exclusionary practices, they should not be seen as an end in themselves.

Conspiracy Theories: Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia as Explanatory Categories

Some scholars argue that only anti-Semitism claims to explain the whole world for anti-Semites, whereas Islamophobia works differently. According to those scholars, anti-Semitism is an irrational construct with little basis in reality, but a long history. Again, these authors treat Islam and Muslims as ontological categories, and, therefore, only support the Islamophobic discourses that they intend to critique and deconstruct. It seems they are blind toward the existence of Islamophobia in dominant groups, arguing that Islamophobia can only be found in fringe right-wing groups. But these are exactly the features that scholars like Mattias Gardell believe to constitute Islamophobia. In his analysis of Anders Behring Breivik’s manifesto, he argues:

Breivik evokes a Manichean struggle between the forces of Light and Darkness, alleging that the Western world is locked in an apocalyptic conflict with “Islam,” depicted as a sinister Being who tirelessly seeks the eradication of Christian Europe. Muslims are constructed as an imagined collective, by “nature” bestowed with inherent, timeless, and malevolent features said to derive from “Islam,” which sets them apart from universal man. The racist logic underlying the figure of the Eternal Muslim is integral to the theory of an Islamic world conspiracy that Breivik promotes, and allows Breivik to link Muslims “here” with the perceived threat from Muslims “there.”
In fact, such Islamophobic thought is not confined to Anders Behring Breivik. As other scholars have likewise shown in their research on Breivik’s manifesto, it draws on various source texts from the far right, but also on so-called mainstream public discourse. Let us consider two examples of such conspiracy theories that can be found elsewhere. One of the most prolific writers of Islamophobic texts, Hans-Peter Raddatz, from Germany, writes in his book, *From Allah to Terror* (Von Allah zum Terror):

No pope, no cardinal, no politician has demonstrated commitment to the interests of Islam, economic liberalism, the Mafia, and Freemasonry as comprehensively as Pope John Paul II, the esoterically trained Karol Wojtyla. 

Here, Islam becomes a force of evil, used to undermine real Christianity and European identity. In a manifesto published by a number of European right wing youth organizations, Islamists are portrayed as a force working together with Marxists, neo-liberals, and capitalists. Popularly cited literature, such as *Eurabia* by Gisèle Litman (Bat Ye’or), has become well-known in circles of Islamophobes, who echo its arguments that the world is being taken over. Such literature can also be found with more “mainstream” authors, such as the late Italian intellectual Orianna Fallaci, British polemicist Niall Ferguson, or the German economist Thilo Sarrazin. In addition, some documents have been “discovered” that are held up as proof of the conspiracy theory that Muslims want to take over the world. Similar to the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, a document called *An Explanatory Memorandum: On the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America* purports to explain how the Muslim Brotherhood wants to take over the USA, working in concert with the Muslim Brother, Barack Hussein Obama. These conspiracy theories reveal the notion, not of an inferior, but a “smart Muslim,” as it is the case with the figure of the “smart Jew.” An example is Geert Wilders’s statement on the war of Muslim elites: “Muslim elites wage a total war against the population everywhere in Europe. They continue with mass immigration and Islamization, which in the end leads to an Islamized Europe, a Eurabia.”

But Islam does not become merely one force among many. In Breivik’s manifesto, Islamization is supported by various players. And as Gardell shows, in Islamophobic thinking, “Islam” gains agency of its own: “In Islamophobia literature, we encounter an ‘Islam’ that walks, talks, commands, oppresses, hates, deceives, conspires, wages war, expands, and retreats.” As observed in anti-Semitism, the argument is made that the religion is inhumane, requiring its adherents to treat believers of other faiths immorally and aggressively. This becomes the basis for a representation of “Muslimness” as an inescapable category. Because Islam moves on its own, Gardell writes that “Islam seems to be the source of an inborn essence of eerie ‘Muslimness.’” This aspect of Islamophobia is very often taken as a basis for a fundamental difference between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: some argue that anti-Semitism constructs the “eternal Jew,” who cannot escape his Jewishness when Jewish identity is represented as a race rather than a religious category. For that reason, Jews cannot convert to Christianity, as advocated by Christian anti-Judaism. Rather, they are, and will always be, Jews. This shift “in alterity from religion to race” marks an important aspect, as it does not point to a religion and a religious actor, but rather imagines the “eternal Jew.” Klug elaborates the definition of anti-Semitism as hostility towards Jews as Jews by saying “Jews are perceived as something other than what they are. Or perhaps more accurately, hostility towards Jews as not Jews.” He goes on to argue that in this process, “anti-Semitism is the process of turning Jews into ‘Jews.’” At the
same time, we should not forget that this notion of anti-Semitism also allowed for exceptions. Recall Adolf Hitler’s private physician, Eduard Bloch, who, according to Hitler, was not a “normal Jew,” and, if all Jews were like Bloch, there would never have been any problem. Hitler considered Bloch to be an Edeljude, a “noble Jew.” This image could exist alongside the killing of six million Jews because these images are not rational and ultimately depend on the group in power.

Considering the above case, it bears remembering that the figure of the Other is very fluid and may vary by context. In a seminar of the Austrian far-right party, Elisabeth Sabbaditsch-Wolff, a central figure in the global Islamophobic network, taught an introductory course on Islam. There, she gave an answer to a student asking how to assess a Muslim person who joins the far-right party. Her answer clearly draws on the ideas discussed above. According to Sabbaditsch-Wolff, this person can only lie because Muslims are taught by their religion to deceive others, to apply the principle of taqiyya (dissimulation). This was obligatory to all Muslims, she said, and the only reason any Muslim would want to join a far-right party is to save his or her own soul for the future. Based on these accounts, authors like Gardell argue that, although Muslims do not constitute a race, Islamophobia operates as racism. This leads us to what may be one of the most interesting aspects of the current discussion on the relationship between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: the question of race.

**RACE: A COMMON BLIND SPOT?**

In the introduction to the special issue of *European Societies* regarding “Anti-Semitism, Racism, and Islamophobia,” the editors claim that, due to the difficulty of establishing anti-Semitism studies as one of the varieties of racism to be researched, they decided “to avoid the risk of diluting the [anti-Semitism] by subsuming it to the [racism].” And, as Glynis Cousin and Robert Fine have shown, there were many historical reasons for the separation of anti-Semitism and racism studies, especially after World War II. In fact, the same issue seems to have been plagued by many authors who treated Islamophobia as a prejudice, resentment, or exclusionary ideology. The incessant quibbling over semantics poses an obstacle to an approach that studies Islamophobia along the same lines as racism. Besides, that is why some Islamophobia scholars consciously decline to use the term Islamophobia at all, preferring to call it “anti-Muslim racism.” Others, such as Hatem Bazian and Ramon Grosfuegel or Enes Bayrakli and me in our European Islamophobia Report, use Islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism interchangeably and thus consider Islamophobia to be a racist phenomenon. Thus, the obstacles stemming from this confusion of the relationship of race and religion in the phenomenon of Islamophobia are manifold. In my view, it is not helpful to regard Islamophobia studies as a field of study separate from racism or post-colonial studies. That is why I defined Islamophobia as anti-Muslim racism in the *European Islamophobia Report* project, newly launched in 2015. Nevertheless, this undertaking goes hand in hand with several political and scholarly problems.

One political problem, especially, but not only, in Europe, is the proclamation of a post-racist world order. When UNESCO declared in its 1969 publication, *Four Statements on the Race Question*, that the “biological fact” of race had to be distinguished from the “social myth” of race, it proposed alternative categories. Due to the abuse of the notion of race, ethnicity and culture were introduced as social and cultural classifiers. According to Alana Lentin, this partly resulted in the separation of race from politics, the proclamation of a post-racial era, and the muffling of discussion of race. Some anti-Semitism scholars seem to
have taken this path, as the introduction to the aforementioned *European Societies* issue shows. Still, many do include anti-Semitism studies in a wider field of racism studies,\(^{87}\) and others have coined the notion of “cultural racism” to problematize this silencing and reveal ongoing racist discourses in a new guise.\(^{88}\)

Nasar Meer shows that, just as anti-Semitism studies is positioned far away from racism studies, the same can be said for Islamophobia studies: “It is striking to observe the virtual absence of an established literature on race and racism in the discussion of Islamophobia.”\(^{89}\) Meer acknowledges that race and religion overlapped prior to the formation of modernity. He also criticizes a blind spot in many theories of racism that neglect to identify religion “as the principle marker of difference.”\(^{90}\) Quoting Ash Amin, he points out that, even today, Muslims’ bodies are identified by “linking vicariously constructed phenotypes (including prayer caps, beards…) to terrorism, radical Islam, sexual slavery, drug trafficking and cultural backwardness.”\(^{91}\) Here, Meer discovers racialization as a core component in anti-Semitic, as well as in Islamophobic, sentiments, employing racialization, as developed by Robert Miles, in the sense of attributing “meaning to somatic characteristics.”\(^{92}\)

One productive way to discuss the relationship between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in conjunction with race and racism is Anya Topolski’s approach. Her essay, *How Jews and Muslims Became Races*, draws on W.E.B. Du Bois’s reference to the relationship between race and religion (which he rediscovered during his stay in Poland), and Frantz Fanon’s analysis of anti-Semitism as a non-color-based racism. Topolski argues that the rise of the new “science” of philology, at a time when the church and theology were losing authority, was what led people to be classified, not along religious lines (Christians, Jews, Mohammedans, and the rest), but along linguistic ones (Semitic, Aryan, and Turanian). This brand of philology, which gained favor around the 1840s, led to the merging of another category of differentiation between Semites and Orientals on one side, and Europeans on the other. Drawing on Anidjar, Topolski argues that this mixture led to a racialization of religion. Anti-Semitism, in its modern form, did not come about until the birth of the nation-state, she says, and she draws on Meer and Modood, arguing that Islamophobia, as cultural racism, has become the new internal Other for Europe after the immigration waves following World War II. She concludes that Europe has not learned the lessons of the Shoah in the face of two “religion”-based forms of racism.\(^{93}\) Meer also stresses that the first time the notion of *race* appeared in a dictionary (in a sixteenth-century dictionary by Sebastian de Covarrubias), it was synonymous with the words “blood” and “religion.”\(^{94}\) Racialized discourses also confused religion and race, as Robert Miles shows in the case of Pope Urban II’s speech to mobilize the crusades, but also in the case of Arabs, Saracens, and Turks, with whom Muslims were identified.\(^{95}\) Prior to the Reconquista, the Prophet Muhammad was also portrayed as a dark-skinned, satanic menace.\(^{96}\)

But even if we see the issue of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia through the lens of a post-racial world order, then a cultural racism, a “racism without race” that takes culture rather than biology or skin color as a basis for an “insurmountable difference,” as Étienne Balibar explains, exists.\(^{97}\) In that sense, for him, post-World War II anti-Semitism becomes a prototype of “neo-racism.”\(^{98}\) Along with these additional questions as to the nature, discourse, and relational dimensions of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, one of the most relevant aspects seems to be the question of politics. That is, to what purposes are anti-Semitism and Islamophobia applied. In my view, Islamophobia studies must spend more time interrogating the political aims behind these structures.
ANOTHER BLIND SPOT: AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POWER

In my reading, Islamophobia is used as an instrument of power, a *Herrschaftsinstrument*, in the desire to gain, keep, and extend *Herrschaft* (power). This is the case when wars are waged by the West and (partly) legitimized by arguing that it will free women from fundamentalists, as in Afghanistan, or when the War on Terror was evoked—a “holy crusade”—against “radical Islam,” as was the case in the aftermath of 9/11 and with the invasion of Iraq in 2003. This has also been the case in the War on Terror in general, where 9/11 has resulted in systematic racial profiling targeting Muslims as visible and suspect subjects, singling them out based on their appearance, their nationality, and their religious beliefs. Post-colonial conditions are present in many countries all over the world, be it in France, where the banlieus with big Muslim populations have become veritable militarized zones where young people are harassed and criminalized, or generally throughout Europe, as Liz Fekete has shown in regard to migration and security policies. Disciplining the Muslim subject has become a central agenda in the nation-state’s Islam policies, as various authors have shown is the case in Germany. One reason for this tendency may rest in the fact that Islamophobia has been informed by post-colonial scholarship on three levels, as Nasar Meer argues: first, that “historical colonial dynamics are reproduced in contemporary postcolonial environments,” second, in “the utility of Orientalist critique for the Islamophobia concept,” and third, “that the ‘making of Muslims’ is signaled by the emergence of the concept of Islamophobia.” Analyzing the relationship of power, representation, and knowledge as a central aim of postcolonial studies based on Said’s writings has had a lasting impact on scholars of Islamophobia, including Hatem Bazian. But still, an examination of Islamophobia studies reveals that many of the central writings of postcolonial studies are hardly reflected in the field at all.

Above all that, Islamophobia is never conceptualized as a *Herrschaftsinstrument*. Anti-Semitism studies tend to pay less attention to these proceedings, and tend to be occupied by discourse analysis, and the separating of conspiracy theories from power structures. Although some of the comparative works have analyzed anti-Semitism and Islamophobia as tools of identity politics that serve to reduce, essentialize, generalize, and fixate upon differences in order to separate the constructed acceptable, normal, and preferable from the unacceptable and abnormal to exclude and discriminate them, these elaborations have merely been on a theoretical level. On the side of the Jewish imagination, this may also be due to the fact that “race relations” have put their emphases on socially disadvantaged and discriminated-against minorities, while Jews were increasingly perceived as white, and started belonging to an upwardly mobile community in Europe and North America, and were, hence, perceived as privileged. This is not the case for the majority of Muslims in the West, who today are at the center of identity debates in the Global North. Thus, it is not surprising that much of the current research on Islamophobia exhibits a growing interest in studying how Islamophobia is used as a tool of power to surveil, control, and discipline the Muslim subject. This may also be a reason why, in many ways, it makes more sense to look to racism studies than anti-Semitism studies. When Hatem Bazian studies how the New Counter-Intelligence Program envisions Muslims as enemies of the state, he clearly draws more on racism studies than on anything else.
CONCLUSIONS

To conclude, studying Islamophobia together with, and/or in relation to, anti-Semitism has provided deeper insights into Islamophobia, including the nature of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, their “shared” histories and discursive analyses, and also central aspects of both phenomena, such as global conspiracy theories and the emergence of Islamophobia as an explanatory category in ideology-driven groups. But the debate is still very much politicized. This can be observed when various scholars begin their comparative inquiry by defending the very legitimacy of such an investigation.

On the other hand, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia studies seem to share some common blind spots, such as the nearly total exclusion of race in the debate. Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are also trivialized and reduced to stereotypes without considering how they relate to issues of power. In addition, one can assume much more potential from comparative analyses. To illustrate: the vast literature on Jewish anti-Semitism (self-hatred of Jews) has almost no representation in Islamophobia studies, although central figures in Islamophobic discourses, such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Necla Kelek, and Hamed Abd-el Samed, act as “native informants” of racist discourses. Some scholars have drawn upon post-colonial literature, but theories from anti-Semitism studies are all but absent. Another strong tradition in anti-Semitism studies that could well-serve Islamophobia studies would be the investigation of sexuality, gender, and the psychoanalytical approach. Hence, it would make sense for Islamophobia scholars to dig a bit deeper into the vast knowledge base contained in anti-Semitism studies, when examining issues facing Muslims. At the same time, considering Islamophobia in relation to racism studies, and actually conceptualizing it as racism, can bring many more insights regarding Islamophobia’s current use as a tool of power, relating to concepts like institutionalized racism, how intelligence services build on images of the enemy, and, particularly, the vast literature of postcolonial studies.

ENDNOTES


2 Said, Edward. Orientalism, 1979, p. 27.


5 http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/178-Report-RT3-en.pdf This was not the only document by an international organization that invoked or tried to tackle Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in the same declaration or report. See also: “UN World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance” held in Durban, South Africa from 31 August to 8 September 2001, the “Warsaw Declaration of May 2005,” a meeting of the Islamic Conference Organization (OIC) in May 2007, and the “Durban II Declaration of the United Nations” in 2009.


12 The most comprehensive examination of a comparative analysis, Schiffer and Wagner’s work, *Antisemitismus und Islamophobie: Ein Vergleich*, is one of the few that has been recognized in English due to their English article: Sabine Schiffer & Constantin Wagner, “Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia - new enemies, old patterns.” *Race and Class*, Vol. 52(3), 2011, pp. 77-84. At the same time, authors such as the long-time head of the Center for anti-Semitism studies in Berlin, Wolfgang Benz, who was one of the pioneers of bringing these issues together, never was received in the global debate to the confinement of his works to the German language.


18 Ibid. p. 226.

19 Ibid. p. 215.

20 Ibid. p. 215.


26 Schiffer & Wagner. *Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia*, p. 83.


28 Ibid.


32 Ibid.

33 Ibid. p. 455.

34 Ibid. p. 458.


36 Schiffer and Wagner propose a distinction between the “analytical/conceptual” level and the “empirical” level, but fail to provide any definition what they mean by “analytical,” “conceptual,” and “empirical.”


38 Ibid. p. 105.

39 Ibid. p. 104.


42 Ibid. p. 455.


44 Fink, W. *Islamisch zwischen Reformation und Aufklärung*


50 Ibid.

51 Ibid. pp. 167-173.


53 Ibid. p. 179.

54 Ibid. pp. 179-198.


56 Ibid. p. 81.

57 Jana Kübel, Neue alte Feinde—“Manchmal fühle ich mich wie ein Jude!,” in: Hafez, Jahrbuch 2012, pp. 34-56.


62 When Rommelspachers speaks of the ‘Dominanzgesellschaft’, what she means is a group of people, which has power. See: Attia, Iman/Köbssel, Swantje/Prasad/ Nivedita. Dominanzkultur reloaded. Neue Texte zu gesellschaftlichen Machtverhältnissen, Bielefeld, 2015.

63 Ibid. p. 41.


67 Ibid.

Some scholars have argued that Muslims can voluntarily change their religious status. Other like Modood have pointed out that “people do not have a choice over the conditions of discrimination into which they are born” (Cited in: Meer, Semantics, scales and solidarities, 511). One could add here that an Islamophobic discourse even affects people who are consciously distancing themselves from being Muslim because they might be used to support Islamophobic thought, as they have chosen not to be Muslim anymore. And even if they do not want this, Islamophobes will look at them as living proof of Islam being something evil or backward. Otherwise, why would somebody abandon something good by choice?


Ibid. 227


Gardell, M. “Crusader Dreams: Oslo 22/7, Islamophobia, and the Quest for a Monocultural Europe” Terrorism and Political Violence, 2014, 26:1, p. 133.


See f.i. the works in German of Iman Attia, Yasemin Shooman, and recently Fanny Uri Müller.

See f.i. the first inaugural issue of the Islamophobia Studies Journal and the texts of Hatem Bazian, Ramon Grosfoguel, and Mohammad H. Tamdgidi.


The European Islamophobia Report is a project, which produces yearly reports on Islamophobia in more than 20 European countries and is planned to be published for the first time in Spring, 2016. Reports can be downloaded here: www.islamophobiaeurope.com.


Benz. 2011.
33 Balibar, Etienne (1991a). ‘Is there a Neo-Racism?’ In: Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, (eds), Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities (pp. 17–28). London: Verso. Still, analytically, we are facing a number of problems. First of all is there a huge amount of literature on race and racism and therefore a number of academic debates around different notions of race, racism, and racialization, which makes it sometimes difficult to say precisely which notion of race has been applied. Nevertheless, it would be ignorant not to discuss the othering of religion together with the othering of race, culture, etc. Racialization—a signifying process that constructs differentiated social collectives as races (Miles 1989, 79)—is of utmost importance in othering groups as different, sometimes superior, sometimes inferior, and most importantly as hostile.


90 Ibid.

91 Amin 2010, cited in: Ibid. 503.


94 Meer, Nasar Racialization and religion, p. 387.

95 Brown & Miles, Racism, p. 29.

96 Meer, Nasar. Racialization and religion, p. 387.


98 Ibid. p. 24.


104 Ibid. pp. 505-6.


To mention only a few: An upcoming special edition of the Islamophobia Studies Journal on Institutionalized Islamophobia is planned. James Renton and Gil Anidjar have organized a conference on ‘Islamophobia and Surveillance: Genealogies of a Global Order’ to be published in a special edition of Ethnic and Racial Studies.
